




Security Council Mandates and the Use of Lethal Force by 
Peacekeepers 
 
Nigel D. White 
 
The Problem 
Since the turn of the 21st century peacekeepers have been under pressure to used 
‘necessary measures’ to protect civilians and to protect the peace process. Peacekeepers 
have been criticised for being inactive in the face of violence when the mandates given to 
them by the Security Council clearly enable them, arguably require them, to use ‘necessary 
measures’ against those who would undermine the peace or threaten civilians. 
Increasingly coercive mandates would suggest that peacekeepers can cross the line to 
become war-fighters or ‘combatants’ in the language of the laws of war (international 
humanitarian law), sometimes causing confusion as to the legal status of peacekeepers who 
are traditionally not seen as legitimate targets. Indeed, attacks on them remain prohibited 
under the 1994 UN Convention on Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. In 
1999, the UN Secretary General attempted to clarify the non-combatant status of 
peacekeepers even in situations of armed conflict, by declaring that they are to be viewed as 
or civilians under international humanitarian law unless and until they actively engage as 
combatants in an armed conflict.1 
Although peacekeepers have been given functions that are less than those of combat but 
more than those of law enforcement, it is argued that this does not somehow place them in 
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a legal no-man’s land. Instead, it is argued that, despite increasingly coercive Security 
Council mandates, peacekeepers remain subject to international human rights law standards 
when using weapons and, only exceptionally, when actively engaged as combatants within 
an armed conflict situation, to international humanitarian law standards, where the right to 
life is qualified by those laws of war that allow ‘enemy’ combatants to be engaged with 
lethal force.2  
Peacekeeping had to be reformed following the disasters of Rwanda in 1994, and Srebrenica 
in 1995, when forces stood by the in the face of genocide. Since the Brahimi Report of 2000 
peacekeepers have been expected to actively support the peace process and peacebuilding 
within a state as well as protect civilians within their areas of deployment.3  This is 
significantly different from the Cold War model developed by the UN whereby the force 
oversaw the peace in the form of a cessation of hostilities.  
 
Widening of Defensive Use of Force 
Over the lifetime of peacekeeping operations there has been confusion as to the nature and 
level of force that peacekeepers are permitted to use. At its core the limited use of force 
available to peacekeepers means self-defense, which is normally interpreted narrowly to 
cover a peacekeeper using force in defense of his own life and those of his comrades.  
While the first force deployed to Suez in 1956 (UNEF) stuck to a narrow interpretation of 
self-defense by using light arms to defend itself, by 1960 there was an alternative version of 
peacekeeping in the Congo (ONUC). ONUC did initially confine its use force to self-defense 
when overseeing the withdrawal of Belgian troops, but that proved inadequate when its task 
became the elimination of the mercenaries supporting the Katangese secession. In reality, in 
1961, ONUC had ceased to act in a defensive way and began to take the initiative and 
enforce the peace by engaging the forces of non-state actors.4 This has occurred in more 
recent operations in the Congo, where, for example, MONUSCO has used offensive force 
including the use of attack helicopters against M23 rebels, for example in July 2012. 
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Despite a post-Cold War trend towards allowing more offensive action to be taken by 
peacekeepers, there remains reluctance, especially from troop contributing nations (TCNs), 
to move away from self-defence as this makes the force less acceptable to the host state 
and the parties within it. TCNs are also reluctant to engage as combatants as this will 
potentially mean that their troops will lose the protection from attack afforded to 
peacekeepers under the 1994 Convention. Thus, self-defense remains the norm for modern 
peacekeeping, even those peace operations having Chapter VII elements to their mandates, 
requiring them to protect the peace process and civilians. However, despite this reticence in 
practice, at the doctrinal level the UN has expanded the concept of self-defense to include 
defence of the mission and of civilians. This development is reflected in the UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations’ latest statement of peacekeeping doctrine in the 2008 
Principles and Guidelines document (sometimes known as the Capstone Document)— 
which, while still distinguishing peacekeeping from enforcement action, states that it is 
‘widely understood that peacekeeping forces may use force at the tactical level, with the 
authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defense and defense of the mandate’.  
 
Applicable Law 
Although Increasingly coercive mandates mean that peacekeepers can potentially cross the 
line to become ‘combatants’; in the language of the laws of war, this is remains the 
exception and not the norm. Normally peacekeepers are deployed to violent but post-
conflict situations where, unless the violence increases to the level of a protracted armed 
conflict in which both the government and peacekeepers are engaged against organized 
armed groups within a state,5 as occurred in the Congo in 1960s and again at the turn of the 
21st century, then the laws of war remain inapplicable to the vast majority of peacekeeping 
operations.  Being based in the host state with the consent of that government signifies that 
a peacekeeping force will not become engaged against the forces of the host state in an 
international armed conflict. Indeed, if were to, the peacekeeping force would cease to be a 
peacekeeping operation and would become a peace enforcement action requiring 
authorization under Article 42 of the UN Charter. 
This would all suggest that international humanitarian law does not play a significant role in 
a post-war situation to which peacekeepers are deployed, and it is the jus post bellum, more 
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accurately those aspects of general international law, human rights law, refugee law, and 
international criminal law, as well as the national criminal and military laws of the TCNs and 
national law of the host state, which together frame the work of a peace operation.  
It follows that for most peacekeepers the relevant international laws will be those governing 
human rights. The existence of human rights obligations on peacekeepers flows from two 
main sources. The first source for peacekeepers is as state agents and comes from the 
human rights obligations of their sending states under human rights treaties, which attaches 
to them even when acting extra-territorially in circumstances where they exercise control 
over areas or over individuals.6 
The second source of human rights obligation applies to peacekeepers as members of a UN 
force, given the UN’s obligations under customary international law that attach to it as an 
international legal person.7 The International Law Commission’s 2011 Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations clearly show that it is possible to attribute 
wrongful acts to the UN,8 and such responsibility is based on it having duties under 
customary international law including ones to uphold and protect human rights.  
 
The Use of Lethal Force and the Right to Life 
Having established that human rights law is normally applicable to peacekeepers, it would 
appear the modern peacekeepers are placed between the rock of human rights constraints 
and the hard place of a Security Council mandate that appears to require them to use lethal 
force in a range of circumstances.  
The fact that UN peacekeepers and armed police carry weapons and their use may cause 
deaths seems at first glance to be incompatible with the right to life. However, major human 
rights treaties make it clear that the right to life, though fundamental, is not absolute. The 
basic principle is that life cannot be taken arbitrarily. Drawing on human rights jurisprudence 
under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, essentially, during peacetime and 
situations short of armed conflict, lethal force can be used by peacekeepers when absolutely 
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necessary for self-defense (including defense of third parties), to effect an arrest or prevent 
escape of a detainee, or in action taken to quell a riot or insurrection. This provides a 
relatively clear legal framework within which peacekeepers should operate. 
A more detailed examination of UN policy and guidelines on when peacekeepers can use 
force, including lethal force, shows that the UN largely acts within this legal framework, 
indeed, that the UN frames its policies and directives largely within the parameters of 
international human rights law, rather than international humanitarian law. As mentioned 
above the 2008 Capstone Document expands somewhat on when potentially lethal force 
may be used, but the Document does explain  that ‘all necessary means’ in the context of a 
peacekeeping mandate, includes lethal force where necessary against ‘militias, criminal 
gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a 
threat to the civilian population’, in order to ‘deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political 
process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national 
authorities in maintaining law and order’. 
It is possible to interpret these guidelines as being compatible with human rights standards if 
the provisions that recognise that potentially lethal force may be used when absolutely 
necessary to effect and arrest or in tackling riots and insurrections is applied to include these 
and analogous situations faced by peacekeepers when force is absolutely necessary to tackle 
militias, criminal gangs and other armed spoilers who undermine the peace or threaten 
civilians. If this purposive interpretation is adopted then it follows that there is sufficient 
leeway in human rights law to enable peacekeepers to perform their functions using 
potentially lethal force where absolutely necessary. 
There remains the problem of ensuring that peacekeepers do not exceed these standards 
under the guise of a Chapter VII mandate that authorize ‘necessary measures’, for necessary 
measures in a situation short of armed conflict are those absolutely necessary to defend 
civilians or to defend peacekeepers when tackling those who undermine the peace. There 
remains the problem found in many UN documents, including UN Rules of Engagement, of 
peacekeepers being permitted to use deadly force to protect UN property, which is generally 
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difficult to reconcile with human rights law,9 though it is permissible in some circumstances 
under international humanitarian law. 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, which states that obligations derived from the UN Charter 
prevails over those in any other international treaty; does not affect the analysis given above 
for a number of reasons, two of which will be mentioned. First, Article 103 does not affect 
customary obligations under human rights law, and protecting the right to life is one of 
those; and, second, Security Council obligations cannot override human rights treaty 
obligations unless the Security Council expressly states that this is the case. Drawing upon 
the European Court of Human Rights judgment in the Al-Jedda of 2011 it is for TCNs to 
interpret Security Council mandates to peacekeepers to use necessary measures in line with 
their human rights obligations unless, and until, the Security Council clearly exempts states 
from these obligations.10 
 
Conclusion 
While the Security Council may feel it has discharged its primary responsibility for peace and 
security by introducing Chapter VII and ‘necessary measures’ into the mandates of modern 
peace operations, it leaves the situation on the ground unclear. Peacekeepers are required 
to use lethal force to protect civilians and to protect the peace process but what this chapter 
has argued is that, in so doing, they are bound by the principles of human rights law and 
only exceptionally by those of international humanitarian law. 
While it is possible to reconcile the ‘protection mandates’ given to modern peace operations 
with the restrictions on the arbitrary deprivation of life contained in human rights law, care 
must be taken, as pressure is increased on peacekeepers and TCNs from mandates being 
produced by the Security Council, not to stray into a legal no-man’s land between human 
rights law and humanitarian law.  In this zone individuals would not have clear rights under 
human rights law nor would they be protected under the laws of war, meaning that the use 
of lethal force in such a zone is likely to be both abused and unaccountable. 
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Of course there is great concern that peacekeepers use force when necessary to protect 
civilians under existential threat, but we must be careful to ensure that while more is done 
to achieve this laudable aim we do not encourage the excessive use of force by 
peacekeepers that may itself leads to the arbitrary deprivation of life.  
